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The study at hand deals with the expectations of professional analysts and 
novices in the context of foreign exchange markets. We analyze the respective 
forecasting accuracy and our results indicate that there exist substantial 
differences between professional forecasts and judgmental forecasts of 
novices. In search of reasonable explanations for the astonishing result, we 
evaluate the nature of professional and experimental expectations in more 
detail and find that while professional exchange rate forecasts seem to be 
biased predictors for the future exchange rates, judgmental forecasts appear to 
be unbiased. Furthermore, professional forecasters consistently expect a 
reversal of forgoing exchange rate changes whereas novices expect a 
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1 Introduction 
The empirical failure of standard economic exchange rate models has been proven at 
least since the seminal work of Meese and Rogoff, [1983a, 1983b]. Rogoff, [2001] 
subsumes the current status very accurately when he states: “To make a long story short 
not only have a subsequent twenty years of data and research  failed to overturn the 
Meese-Rogoff result, they have cemented it …”. According to the standard 
macroeconomic exchange rate models expectations play a decisive role in the 
determination of exchange rates. It is usually assumed that expectations are formed 
rationally, i.e. market participants process all available information on the basis of the 
“correct” exchange rate model. Thereby the considered information set typically 
consists of macroeconomic fundamentals like money supplies, interest rates, inflation 
rates. 
The aim of this study is to analyze the human expectation formation in more detail. 
Basically, two different approaches can be identified in the literature regarding the 
analysis of expectation formation. On the one hand, expectation formation is analyzed 
within empirical studies. These studies use survey expectations collected by suppliers of 
financial data. On the other hand, experimental studies draw on expectations collected 
from subjects in a laboratory. This study considers both ways of analyzing human 
expectation formation and contrasts both results against each other. 
In a large number of mostly experimental studies the influence of expertise on the 
forecasting performance was analyzed. The comparison of experts and novices has 
repeatedly revealed that novices’ forecasts are more accurate, a finding which was 
called the inverted expertise effect. Steal von Holstein and C.A., [1972] compared stock 
price predictions of statisticians, students, university teachers, market experts and 
bankers. While the performance of all subjects was poor, contrary to expectations, the 
one of the bankers was the worst. In a replication of the experiments by Yates et al., 
[1991], Önkal-Atay and Muradoglu, [1996] supported their finding that students with 
prior investment experience (i.e. semi-experts) performed worse than unexperienced 
students in a stock price forecasting task. While these two studies were limited to 
students, Önkal-Atay and Muradoglu, [1996] asked portfolio managers (experts), bank 
managers (semi-experts) and business students (novices) for probability forecasts of 
under different task formats. They could not find general support for the inverted 
expertise effect.  
In our present study we compare point forecasts of the €/US-$ exchange rate surveyed 
from professional analysts and experimentally generated point forecasts of students for 
a simulated exchange rate time series. Our analysis is focused on the aggregated level of 
consensus forecasts, thus we compare average behavior and neglect the behavior of 
individuals. There are many studies about accuracy especially, in the context of earnings 
forecasts of financial analysts (for a concise review we refer to Brown, [1993]). 
However, in the context of foreign exchange rates studies dealing with the forecasting 
accuracy are rather rare. The focus of studies related to exchange rate expectations 
rather deal with the question whether expectations are rational (see e.g. Cavaglia et al., 
[1994])   2
Overall, we investigate forecasts for three different forecasting horizons: one-step, 
three-step and six-step ahead forecasts. With our systematic analysis of professional 
exchange rate forecasts and judgmental forecasts of novices, we try to find differences 
and similarities in the human expectation formation that allow us to derive possible 
explanations for the poor forecasting accuracy of the professional exchange rate 
forecasters. 
The reminder of the study is as follows. In the next section we explore the forecasting 
accuracy of professional exchange rate forecasters. Afterwards, the forecasting accuracy 
of students’ experimental forecasts are examined. In section 4, we analyze the nature of 
expectations in more detail. In particular, we investigate the rationality of professional 
and experimental forecasts. Furthermore, we evaluate whether professional and 
experimental forecasts are adaptive and extrapolative. Finally, we discuss our results 
and provide a possible explanation for the poor forecasting performance of professional 
exchange rate forecasts compared to the experimental forecasts of novices.  
2  Analysis of professional exchange rate forecasts 
2.1 Data 
Our analysis of professional forecasts is based on survey data provided by three 
different suppliers of financial data: Reuters, Consensus Economics and ZEW 
Finanzmarkttest from the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW).
1 The period 
under consideration starts in January of 1999 and ends in March of 2003. The available 
forecast horizons vary depending on the supplier and are summarized in Table 1. Figure 
1 shows the survey data that was received at a given date for different time horizons. 
The spot €/US-$ exchange rate is taken from the IFS CD-ROM of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Here we use the end-of-month values of the preceding month 
since the market forecasts are given at the end or the beginning of a month: for instance, 
the December one-month forecast for January is typically made at the end of 
November/beginning of December. Thus, we compare this value with the actual end of 
the December spot rate. 
Table 1: Available forecast data 
 Period  Forecast  horizon 
Consensus Economics  1999/1-2002/12 3  months 
Reuters  1999/1-2003/2  1, 3, 6 months 
ZEW-Finanzmarkttest  1999/1-2002/12 6  months 
 
                                                 
1 Information about the suppliers of the survey data can be found on www.consensuseconomics.com, 
www.reuters.com and www.zew.de.   3





























































































































































Note: The professional exchange rate forecasts are shifted back to the time of forecast formation. 
2.2  Accuracy of professional exchange rate forecasts 
For an evaluation of the forecasting accuracy of professional analysts we refer to the 
relative mean error (ME), the relative mean squared error (MSE) and the relative mean 
absolute error (MAE).
2 We decided to use relative measures for the forecast errors in 
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order for our results for the accuracy of professional forecasts to be comparable to those 
for the experimental forecasts. In addition, we use the Theil’s inequality coefficient to 
directly compare the forecasting performance of professional forecasts with naïve 
random walk forecasts (see Moosa, [2000]). 
 
Table 2: Accuracy of professional forecasts 
 ME  MSE  MAE  Theil’s  U 





(0.0233)  1.0952 





(0.0494)  1.1710 





(0.0494)  1.2462 





(0.0609)  1.3465 





(0.0609)  1.1611 
In parenthesis are the measures for naïve random walk forecasts. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results for accuracy of professional exchange rate forecasts. As 
for all market forecasts mean errors are positive, professional forecasters tend to 
overestimate the future development of the Euro against the US-dollar in the considered 
time period. In addition, the comparison of the accuracy of professional forecasts with 
naïve random walk forecasts reveals that for all measures the random walk is superior to 
professional forecasts. This result is also approved by the Theils’s inequality coefficient 
that is clearly above one for all market forecasts. However, these results do not indicate 
whether the differences between the forecasting accuracy of market forecasts and naïve 
random walk forecasts are statistically significant. For this purpose we refer to three 
different statistical tests. In particular we apply an asymptotic test as suggested by 
Diebold and Mariano, [1995], the Wilcoxon’s Signed-Rank test and the Morgan-
Granger-Newbold test (see for a detailed discussion of these tests Diebold and Mariano, 
[1995]).  
 
Table 3: Tests of differences in professional forecast errors 


































P-values are in parenthesis.   5
 
Table 3 summarizes the results of statistical tests comparing the forecasting accuracy of 
professional exchange rate forecasters and naïve random walk forecasts. The 
corresponding null hypothesis consists of no differences in the forecasting accuracy of 
both forecasts. The results indicate that the forecasting performance of professional 
exchange rate forecasters are statistically significant worse than those of naïve random 
walk forecasts. Merely for the six month forecasts of Reuters and ZEW the asymptotic 
test reveals the same forecast performance for both forecasts.  
To investigate the usefulness of professional forecasts as direction of change forecasts 
we carry out a simple χ
2-test of independence (see Diebold and Lopez, [1996]). Thereby 
the forecasting quality of professional forecasts is compared to a naïve coin flip. The 
test is based on a 2 x 2 contingency table (see Table 4). The hit rate of the direction-of-
change forecasts is given by the quotient (N11 + N22)/N. The actual exchange rate 
changes are defined as “up” if ∆St+h ≥ 0 and as “down” if ∆St+h < 0. Accordingly, 
expected exchange rate changes are defined as “up” if Et∆St+h ≥ 0 and as “down” if 
Et∆St+h < 0. N.1 and N.2 denote the total frequency of “actual change up” and “actual 
change down”. Correspondingly, N1. and N2. denote the total frequency of “expected 
change up”, respectively, “expected change down”. The null hypothesis of the test is 
that the entries in the contingency table are completely random, so that the hit rate is 
close to 50 %. According to Diebold and Lopez, [1996], the corresponding test statistic 












CE N N N
E =
−
== ⋅ ∑  (1) 
whereby C is under the null hypothesis C → 2
1 χ .  
Table 4: 2x2 contingency table of the χ
2-test 
  Actual change “up”  Actual change “down”   
Expected change “up  N11  N12  N1. 
Expected change “down”  N21  N22  N2. 
  N.1  N.2  N 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the χ
2-test. It clearly shows that professional forecasts are 
poor predictors for the future direction of exchange rate changes. Only the six months 
forecasts of the ZEW show a hit rate slightly above 50%. However, this result is not 
statistically significant.
3 For all other market forecasts the hit rate is well below 50%, 
whereby no result is statistically significant.  
                                                 
3 The 0.90 quantile of the χ² distribution is 2.7055 (df = 1).   6
 











1-month Reuters forecasts  13 18 10  9  44.00% 
[0.5426] 
3-months Reuters forecasts  21 25  0  2  47.92% 
[1.6232] 
3-months Consensus forecasts  21 25  0  2  47.92% 
[1.6232] 
6-months Reuters forecasts  21 23  0  1  48.89% 
[0.8949] 
6-months ZEW forecasts  21 22  0  2  51.11% 
[1.8314] 
Test-statistics are given in brackets. 
 
Altogether, the empirical results show that the forecasting accuracy of professional 
exchange rate forecasts is rather low. None of the market forecasts is able to beat a 
naïve random walk forecast, whereby this result is statistically significant. Furthermore, 
professional market forecasts even fail to predict the future direction of exchange rate 
changes. 
3  Experimental analysis of human forecasting behavior 
Although the negative results for the professional exchange rate forecasts are 
completely in line with the empirical evidence of macroeconomic exchange rate models 
(see Meese and Rogoff, [1983a] and Meese and Rogoff, [1983b]), it is hard for 
economists to accept the unsatisfying outcome. Therefore, we decided to investigate the 
human forecasting behavior in an experimental environment to extract potentially 
important characteristics of the human forecasting behavior. 
3.1  Experiment design  
The experiments were conducted in 2003 at computer terminals at the Department of 
Economics, University of Wuerzburg and at the Department of Statistics and Operations 
Research, University of Graz. Overall, three experiments were run with a total of 136 
undergraduate students. The subject’s task was comprised of the prediction of a time 
series, one-period (46 subjects), three-periods (45 subjects) and six-periods ahead (45 
subjects). The size of the groups is comparable to the samples of professional 
forecasters. Subjects were not allowed to participate in more than one experiment. The 
experimental procedures were identical in all three experiments, solely the forecasting 
horizon varies across the three experiments. Figure 2 shows a English translation of the 
computer screen the participants are facing during the experiment. On the screen the 
subjects are informed about their own past forecasts and the actual time series up to the 
time of forecasting. 
   7
Figure 2: Screenshot of the computer experiment 
 
 
The time series xt presented to the subjects is a realisation of an autoregressive process 
of second order, 
  01 12 2 tt t t xx x α αα ε −− =+ + + , 
with the coefficients α0  = 0.09, α1  = 1.19, α2  = -0.28 and the error term εt being 
uniformly distributed in the interval [-5;5]. The coefficients were estimated from the 
US-$/€ exchange rate time series. All values have two decimal places. The first value of 
the experimental time series was presented to the subjects before they emitted their 
initial forecast. No further history of past values was presented. The time series was 
unlabelled and the subjects were not given any contextual or background information. 
Overall, the subjects made 41 forecasts. Figure 4 shows the time series xt and the 
average forecasts of the three groups that were made in that period. 
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Note: The judgmental forecasts are shifted back to the time of forecast formation. 
In order to provide appropriate incentives, the subjects received payments according to 
their forecasting accuracy. The payments are based on absolute forecast errors and had 
the form  {}
42
2max ;0 t t af
= − ∑ , where  t f  denotes the individual forecast and a is a 
constant value. The constant a was set to 30 cents in the one-step and six-step task and 
was set to 40 cents for the three-step ahead forecasts, in order to assure equal 
payments.
4 The average payment across all three experiments was approximately 3 € for 
an average duration of about 20 minutes. 
3.2  Accuracy of experimental forecasts 
To make the experimental forecasts comparable to the professional forecasts, we 
aggregated the individual forecasts of the novices in each experiment by calculating 
their arithmetic mean. The accuracy of the experimentally generated average forecasts is 
analyzed by the means of the above applied measures. Table 6 presents the results for 
the forecasting accuracy of judgmental forecasts. Whereas professional forecasters 
overestimate the time series, the negative values for mean errors indicate that the 
judgmental forecasts underestimate the time series in all experiments. The mean squared 
errors in all experiments are lower than the corresponding values of the naïve random 
walk forecasts. Consequently, the Theil’s inequality coefficient is below the critical 
value of one for all three forecast horizons. However, the judgmental forecasts are not 
                                                 
4 We knew from the results of pilot studies that the three-step ahead forecasting task was more difficult 
than the others. The payment scheme had to be modified in order to equalize the financial rewards for all 
subjects.    9
generally superior to naïve random walk forecasts since the mean absolute errors of 
one- and three-step ahead forecasts are larger than the naïve benchmark. Only for the 
six-step ahead horizon judgmental forecasts perform better than the random walk by all 
error measures. 
Table 6: Accuracy of experimental forecasts 
  ME MSE  MAE  Theil’s  U 







(0.1094)  0.9725 







(0.2051)  0.9195 







(0.3154)  0.8018 
In parenthesis are the measures for naïve random walk forecasts. 
 
To check the results for statistical significance, we also carried out the tests for 
differences in the forecast errors of judgmental forecasts and naïve random walk 
forecasts. The results reveal that although the performance seems to be better at first 
glance it is not statistically significant (see Table 7). Only for the six step ahead 
forecasts the Morgan-Granger-Newbold test suggest a statistically significant better 
performance of judgmental forecasts. 
Table 7: Tests of differences in experimental forecast errors 




























P-values are in parenthesis. 
A possible explanation for the relatively good performance of judgmental forecasts may 
be found in the correct anticipation of the future direction of the time series. Table 11 
illustrates the quality of experimental forecasts as a direction of change forecasts. 
However, although the one step and six step ahead forecasts show a hit rate of over 50% 
the results are statistically insignificant, so that it is fair to conclude that judgmental 
forecast are not able to predict the future direction of the time series accurately. 
Table 8: Experimental forecasts as direction of change forecasts 









1 step ahead 
forecasts  13 18 10  9  56.1% 
[0.563] 
3 step ahead 
forecasts  7 11  14 9  39.0% 
[1.953] 
6 step ahead 
forecasts  7  10 10 14  51.2% 
[0.001] 
Test statistics are given in brackets.   10
4  The nature of expectations  
The results of section 2 and 3 have shown that professional forecasters perform worse 
than novices in an experimental environment. The forecasting accuracy of professional 
exchange rate forecasters is significantly worse than naïve random walk forecasts, 
whereas the novices in our experimental setting perform at least as good as the naïve 
forecasts. This outcome is quite astonishing as, on the one hand, novices did not possess 
any contextual information concerning the evolution of the time series and, on the other 
hand, the forecasting performance of novices is evaluated over all 41 periods, although 
the subjects did not knew any history of the time series and thus the forecasting task is 
very difficult in the first periods. 
An explanation for this results may be found in the nature of expectations. Possibly, 
professional forecasters and novices show different characteristics with regard to their 
expectations that may be responsible for differences in their forecasting performance. 
With respect to expectations the economic literature highlights the prominence of the 
concept of rational expectations. According to the rational expectations hypothesis 
(REH), rational subjects produce unbiased forecasts by using all available information.  
In the following, we first evaluate the rational expectation hypothesis empirically. 
Afterwards, we investigate different expectation formation mechanisms which may also 
help us to identify important differences between professional exchange rate forecasts 
and judgmental forecasts of novices. 
4.1  Rational expectation hypothesis 
The rational expectation hypothesis implies that forecast errors of rational subjects (ξt+1) 
conditioned on the available information set  (Ωt) should be purely random, 
  ( ) ( )
2
11 1 1 ,   with   ~ 0, tt t t t SE S ξ ξσ ++ + + =− Ω  (2) 
where  S denotes the nominal spot exchange rate and E is the rational expectations 
operator. Thus, the unbiasedness hypothesis implies that under REH forecasts errors are 
expected to be zero, i.e. they fluctuate randomly so that ex post no systematic deviations 
of the actual spot rate from the expected rate should be observed. The unbiasedness 
hypothesis can be tested econometrically by regressing the actual change in the spot 
exchange rate on the expected change according to the professional forecasts. Thus, the 
null hypothesis of unbiasedness implies that it is possible to decompose st+h-st as 
  ( ) th t tth t th ss E ss α βε ++ + −=+ − +  (3) 
where s is the logarithm of the nominal spot exchange rate, α = 0, β = 1 and εt+h has a 
mean of zero and is uncorrelated with EtSt+h-St (see Cavaglia et al., [1994], p. 327).  
A second implication of the rational expectation hypothesis is that forecast errors of 
rational subjects are serially uncorrelated. This condition can directly be tested by 
estimating 
  11 22 tt tn t n t ξ αβ ξ β ξ β ξ ε −− − =+ + ++ + "  (4)   11
The hypothesis of serially uncorrelated forecast errors implies that α = β1 = β2=…= 
βn=0. 
Furthermore, the rational expectation hypothesis implies that rational subjects generate 
their forecasts by using all available information efficiently. This implication is often 
called the orthogonality condition. According to the orthogonality hypothesis rational 
forecasts incorporate all available information, so that their predictive power can not be 
improved by the inclusion of any variable that is known at the time of expectation 
formation. Consequently, forecasts errors must be uncorrelated with any variable in the 
available information set. The orthogonality hypothesis can be tested by regressing the 
ex post forecast errors against some known information available when market 
participants form their forecasts, 
  th tth t th sE s X α βε ++ + − =+ +  (5) 
where Xt is a set of information known at time t and the orthogonality hypothesis holds 
if α = 0 and β = 0. In our regression approach, the information set Xt contains lagged 
exchange rates, so that the regression equation is given as  
  12 1 1 th tth t t ntn th sE s s s s α ββ β ε ++ − − − + −= + ++ + + " . (6) 
4.1.1  Rationality of professional exchange rate forecasts 
Already a simple graphical analysis illustrates that professional forecasts are difficult to 
reconcile with rational expectation hypothesis (see Figure 4). Instead of fluctuating 
randomly, the forecasts exhibit systematic deviations. Until the spring of 2002 almost 
all forecasts were too optimistic for the Euro; after that date they were too pessimistic. 





























































































































































Table 9 shows the results of estimating equation (3) for each market forecast and for 
each available forecast horizon via ordinary lest squares (OLS). The standard errors for 
the three and six months market forecasts stem from applying the Newey and West, 
[1987] estimation procedure that allows for heteroscedasticity in the error terms.
5 For an 
evaluation of the null hypotheses of α = 0 and β = 1, we carry out Wald Tests. Table 9 
demonstrates the corresponding F-statistics. However, it must be noted that the results 
of the Wald Tests should be interpreted with caution as the standard assumptions with 
respect to the F-test are rather demanding and may not be fulfilled. 
Table 9: Test of unbiasedness for the US-$/€ market forecasts 
  α  H0: α = 0  β  H0: β = 1  H0: α = 0, β 
= 1 


















































Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
 
For all market forecasts the results indicate that the hypothesis of unbiasedness should 
be rejected. Figure 5 illustrates that the slope coefficients (β) for all professional market 
forecasts over all forecasting horizons are negative instead of being approximately one. 
Consequently, the regression results indicate that although the α coefficients are almost 
close to zero, the β coefficients clearly depart from one. The Wald-Tests suggest that for 
all market forecasts the null hypothesis of α = 0 can not be rejected. However, the null 
hypothesis of β = 1 and the joint hypothesis of α = 0 and β = 1 can not be maintained. 
                                                 
5 Hansen and Hodrick, [1980] demonstrate that, when the forecast horizon is larger than the observational 
frequency, the forecast error εt+k will be serially correlated. This can be corrected by using the Newey and 
West, [1987] estimation procedure (see Cavaglia et al., [1994], pp. 327). We also run all regressions by 
explicitly modeling the autocorrelation structure of residuals. Overall, these results coincide with the 
results obtained by using Newey and West, [1987] estimation procedure. The results are available on 
request.   13
Figure 5: Scatter diagrams for the unbiasedness hypothesis of professional 
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The results of testing for serial correlation in professional forecast errors also indicate 
that the rational expectation hypothesis must be rejected for almost all professional 
exchange rate forecasts. Table 10 summarizes the results of estimating equation (4) via 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and the corresponding Wald tests, which check for the 
hypothesis of α = β1 = β2=…= β4=0. Just for the one month Reuters exchange rate 
forecasts the null hypothesis can not be rejected. All other professional exchange rate 
forecasts show serially correlated forecast errors.  
Table 10: Test for serial correlation in professional forecast errors 
  α  β1  β2  β3  β4 
H0: α = 







































































Standard errors are in parenthesis; p-values in brackets. 
 
The orthogonality hypothesis is empirically evaluated by the means of estimating 
equation (6). Table 11 shows the corresponding results which are obtained by using 
ordinary least squares (OLS). The standard errors for the three and six months market 
forecasts stem form applying the Newey and West, [1987] estimation procedure that 
allows for heteroscedasticity in the error terms.
6 For an evaluation of the null hypothesis 
α = β1 = β2=…= β4=0, we carry out Wald tests. The corresponding F-statistics are also 
summarized in Table 11.  
The results for the orthogonality hypothesis are somewhat mixed. For the one-month 
and three-months professional exchange rate forecasts from Reuters the Wald tests 
indicate that the orthogonality hypothesis can not be rejected. Thus, these forecasts are 
in line with the orthogonaliy hypothesis. However, for the three-months Consensus 
forecasts and the six-months Reuters and ZEW forecasts the null hypothesis of 





                                                 
6 See FN 5.   15
Table 11: Orthogonality test for professional exchange rate forecasts 
  α  β1  β2  β3  β4 
H0: α = 
β1…β4 = 0




























































Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
 
Overall, our results are in line with the results reported in other studies. Chinn and 
Frankel, [2002] analyze 24 survey forecasts of the Currency Forecasters’ Digest. They 
found that the unbiasedness hypothesis is resoundingly rejected. Harvey, [1999] 
investigated the unbiasedness hypothesis of survey forecasts for the British Pound, the 
Deutsche Mark, the Japanese Yen and the Swiss Franc against the US-dollar. His results 
also indicate a wholesale rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis. Similar results are 
also reported by .e.g. Dutt and Ghosh, [1997], Sobiechowski, [1996], Cavaglia et al., 
[1994], Cavaglia et al., [1993] and Beng and Siong, [1993]. For the orthogonality 
hypothesis the empirical evidence is rather similar. Cavaglia et al., [1993] choose to 
include the forward premium into the information set Xt and find that the forward 
premium contains additional information for exchange rate forecasts. Beng and Siong, 
[1993] report that forecasters could have improved their predictions of future exchange 
rates by better exploiting existing information. Sobiechowski, [1996] rejects the null 
hypothesis of orthogonality in three out of four forecast horizons. Harvey, [1999] also 
analyzes the orthogonality hypothesis for various exchange rates and finds a sound 
rejection of the hypothesis. 
4.1.2  Rationality of experimental forecasts 
In contrast to the professional exchange rate forecast errors, judgmental forecast errors 
of novices fluctuate much more randomly and show no systematic biases (see Figure 6). 
This visual impression is also approved by the scatter diagrams for the unbiasedness 
hypothesis of experimental forecasts. Unlike the professional forecasts the correlation 
between the expected change and the actual change appears clearly to be positive.    16
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In order to analyse statistically whether judgmental forecasts are consistent with the 
unbiasedness hypothesis, we ran the regression equation (3) for the judgmental forecasts 
of novices for all three horizons. The estimation results are summarized in Table 8. 
Again, the standard errors for the three-step and six-step ahead forecasts stem from 
applying the Newey and West, [1987] estimation procedure (see FN 5). The α 
coefficients do not differ significantly from zero and the β coefficients do not depart 
significantly from one. Thus, the results for the Wald-Tests suggest that the joint 
hypothesis of α = 0 and β = 1 can not be rejected for judgmental forecasts over all 
considered horizons so that we conclude that the unbiasedness hypothesis can not be 
rejected by estimating equation (3). 
Table 12: Test of unbiasedness for the judgmental forecasts 
  α  H0: α = 0  β  H0: β = 1  H0: α = 0, β = 1




































Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
However, the test for serial correlation in the judgmental forecast errors indicates that 
forecast errors are serially correlated for the three-step and six-step ahead forecasts (see 
Table 13). These results point to first caveats against the rational expectation hypothesis 
in the context of judgmental forecasts. 
Table 13: Test for serial correlation in experimental forecast errors 
  α  β1  β2  β3  β4 
H0: α = 
β1…β4 = 0 










































Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets.   18
Further evidence against the rational expectation hypothesis in the context of 
judgmental forecasts can be obtained from the verification of the orthogonality 
hypothesis. The orthogonality hypothesis is empirically evaluated by the means of 
estimating equation (6) for the judgmental forecasts via OLS. The standard errors for 
the three-step and six-step ahead forecasts are again adjusted according to the Newey 
and West, [1987] procedure (see FN 5). The joint hypothesis of α = β1 = β2=…= β4=0 
is investigated via Wald tests; the corresponding F-statistics are given in Table 14 as 
well. 
The results reveal that for the six-step ahead forecasts the orthogonality hypothesis must 
be rejected according to the Wald tests. For the one-step ahead forecasts the null of 
orthogonality can be maintained. However, the results for the orthogonality hypothesis 
are quite sensitive to the size of lags included in the regression. For example, including 
eight lags in the regression leads to resounding rejection of the null of orthogonality. 
Table 14: Orthogonality test for the judgmental forecasts 
  α  β1  β2  β3  β4 
H0: α = 
β1…β4 = 0 










































Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
 
Overall, our empirical results for the rational expectation hypothesis in the context of 
judgmental forecasts are much more mixed compared to the results for the professional 
exchange rate forecasts. Whereas the first test for unbiased judgmental forecasts 
indicates that these forecasts are mainly in line with the concept of rational expectations, 
both other tests show that maintenance of the rational expectations hypothesis for 
judgmental forecasts is at least doubtful. This is especially true for the three-step and 
six-step ahead forecasts. 
However, our results align with the evidence reported in previous experimental studies. 
In an experiment of Dwyer et al., [1993] subjects had to report one-step ahead forecasts 
of a pure random walk. This simple experimental setting allows the straightforward 
analysis of rational expectations, because rationality is clearly defined: subjects should 
forecast the previous observation for the next period. The forecasts were found to be 
unbiased and the subjects made efficient use of the available information, a results that  
provides support for rational expectations. In an earlier study also concerned with 
judgmental forecasts of pure random walks, Mason, [1988] concluded similarly. 
However, the majority of the authors find little support for the rational expectation 
hypothesis from experimental data. Schmalensee, [1976], Garner, [1982], Brennscheidt, 
[1993] and Hey, [1994] (to mention a few) had to reject the hypothesis of rational 
expectations in their forecasting experiments. Especially for describing the individual 
forecasting behaviour, the rational expectation hypothesis appears to be inappropriately. 
The consistency with rational expectations seems to depend on the task complexity, 
which was also considered by Dwyer et al.    19
Summarising the empirical evidence for the rational expectation hypothesis for 
professional exchange rate forecasts and judgmental forecasts, we have to state that the 
rational expectation hypothesis is rejected for both kinds of forecasts. However, the 
results show interesting differences in the characteristics of professional exchange rate 
forecasts and experimental forecasts of novices. Whereas the unbiasedness hypothesis 
has to be clearly rejected for the professional exchange rate forecasts, the judgmental 
forecasts of novices seem to be unbiased. According to the results of testing for serial 
correlation in forecast errors and orthogonality, we find no meaningful differences 
between professional forecasts and forecasts of novices.  
4.2  Different expectation formation mechanisms? 
The nature of the expectation formation mechanism may be responsible for the accuracy 
and rationality of forecasts. Thus, differences in the expectation formation mechanism 
may be an explanation for the differences between professional exchange rate forecasts 
and judgmental forecasts of novices. Typically, two different expectation formation 
mechanisms are explored in the literature. The first kind of expectation formation 
mechanism is called adaptive expectations. According to this expectation formation 
mechanism expectations are a function of current expectation errors. The second kind of 
expectation formation is called extrapolative expectations and captures the impact of 
past realization on the expectation formation. 
Both expectation formation mechanism will be tested empirically against the alternative 
of static expectations. In this context static expectations correspond to the naïve random 
walk forecast. Since professional exchange rate forecasts perform statistically worse 
than naïve forecasts we expect that the hypothesis of static expectations must be 
rejected. For the judgmental forecasts of novices we expect to confirm the hypothesis of 
static expectations. 
4.2.1 Adaptive  expectations 
The first kind of expectation formation is called adaptive expectations. The adaptive 
expectations hypothesis - or error-learning model – describes the change of the forecast 
as an adjustment depending on the error between the actual exchange rate and the last 
forecast: 
  ( ) tth tht t tht t Es E s s E s α βε +− − −= + − +  (7) 
The adaptive expectation hypothesis requires that α = 0 and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The case β = 1 
represents the naïve forecast Etst+h= st. 
4.2.1.1  Adaptive expectations of professional forecasts 
The results of estimating equation (7) using professional exchange rate forecasts are 
summarized in Table 15. The standard errors for the three-step/months and six-
step/months forecasts stem from applying the Newey and West, [1987] estimation 
procedure. The β coefficients of all forecasts are significantly smaller than one except 
for the 1-month Reuters forecasts. The joint hypothesis of α = 0 and β = 1 has to be 
rejected for all forecasts although the hypothesis α =   0  has to be rejected for all 
forecasts. Thus the data can be interpreted as being consistent with adaptive   20
expectations. Overall, this result correspond largely with the existing empirical evidence 
on adaptive expectations in the context of foreign exchange markets (see Chinn and 
Frankel, [2002]).  
Table 15: Test for adaptive expectations of professional forecasts 






























































Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets. 
4.2.1.2  Adaptive expectations of judgmental forecasts 
The tests for adaptive expectations reveal quite different results that were observed for 
professionals as it is reported in Table 16. All α coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero. The β coefficients are significantly smaller than one for the three- 
and six-step ahead forecasts, but significantly larger for the one-step ahead forecasts. 
This means that the hypothesis of adaptive expectations has to be rejected for the short 
term forecasts but can be maintained for the others. These mixed results from the 
adaptive model do not help to explain the differences in forecasting accuracy. 
Table 16: Test for adaptive expectations of judgmental forecasts 
  α  H0: α = 0  β  H0: β = 1  H0: α = 0, β = 
1 































4.2.2 Extrapolative  expectations 
The second kind of expectation formation is called extrapolative expectations. 
According to this expectation mechanism, the expectations are affected solely by past 
realizations: 
  ( ) tth t t th t Es s s s α βε +− − =+ − +. (8) 
Crucial for the interpretation of this expectation mechanism is the sign of the coefficient 
β. If β < 0, expectations are stabilizing in the sense that a recent movement in the 
exchange rate gives rise to the expectation of a reserve change in the future. Is β > 0, 
expectations are called bandwagon expectations. Here, forecasters expect that current 
exchange rate movements will recur in the future. For β = 0, forecasters have static   21
expectations, i.e. they expect that future exchange rate changes are independent from 
past exchange rate changes. Thus, they believe exchange rates follow a random walk 
process. 
4.2.2.1  Extrapolative expectations of professional exchange rate forecasts 
Figure 8 displays the scatter diagrams of the expected h-month exchange rate change 
versus the previous h-month change. Obviously, past exchange rate changes have a 
substantial impact on the expected future exchange rate changes. Thereby, the negative 
slope of the regression line indicates that professional exchange rate forecasters usually 
expect a reversal of past exchange rate movements in the future. Consequently 
professional exchange rate expectations can be classified as stabilizing in the above 
mentioned sense. The visual evidence is also confirmed by empirical analysis. For this 
purpose we run the regression equation (8) for all available professional exchange rate 
forecasts, whereby we include previous one month exchange rate changes as well as 
past exchange rate changes over the applied forecasting horizon. The results are 
summarized in Table 17. 
The results of estimating equation (8) show that professional exchange rate forecasts for 
the one month Reuters forecasts and the 6 months ZEW forecasts considering the past 
one month exchange rate changes appear to be static. However, for all other 
expectations the regression analyzes reveals that the β coefficients are statistically 
significant negative, so that the hypothesis of static expectations is rejected in favor of 
stabilizing expectations. Consequently, professional exchange rate forecasters expect on 
average that the current exchange rate movement will be reversed in the future. These 
results are in line with the findings of Cavaglia et al., [1993] who report also negative β 
coefficients for professional exchange rate forecasts. 
Table 17: Test for extrapolative expectations of professional forecasts 
    α  β  H0: β = 0 











[0.0892]  3-months Reuters forecasts 











[0.0475]  3-months Consensus forecasts 











[0.0000]  6-months Reuters forecasts 











[0.0005]  6-months ZEW forecasts 






Newey and West, [1987] adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. 
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4.2.2.2  Extrapolative expectations of judgmental forecasts 
In contrast to the professional forecasts, the results for the judgmental forecasts of 
novices is not so clear cut. The scatter diagrams of the expected h-step change versus 
the previous h-step change indicates that for the one step ahead forecasts a positive 
slope coefficient is found, so that novices form bandwagon expectations over the short 
forecasting horizon (see Figure 9). However, for the three-step and six-step ahead 
forecast the slope coefficients are again negative which implies that long-run 
expectations are expected to be stabilizing. 
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Table 18 shows the results for estimating equation (8) for the judgmental forecasts. 
Again, we include previous one–step ahead changes as well as past changes over the 
applied forecasting horizon in the regression analysis. As expected from the visual 
evidence, the one-step ahead forecasts reveal a tendency for extrapolating past changes 
in the future. The related β coefficient is found to be statistically significant and the 
Wald test clearly rejects the null hypothesis of β = 0. For the three step ahead forecasts 
the empirical tests indicate that these expectations are static. Neither the β coefficients   24
are statistically significant different from 0 nor the Wald tests suggest that the null 
hypothesis of β = 0 must be rejected. With regard to the six step ahead forecasts, the 
results show a tendency that these expectations are stabilizing, although considering 
past one-step ahead changes indicate static expectations. 
Table 18: Test for extrapolative expectations of judgmental forecasts 
   α  β  H0: β = 0 











[0.2654]  3 step ahead forecasts 











[0.0092]  6 step ahead forecasts 






Newey and West, [1987] adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Overall, for the extrapolative expectation mechanism we find interesting differences 
between professional and judgmental forecasts concerning the impact of past 
realizations on future expected movements. Whereas professional exchange rate 
forecasters predominantly expect that current exchange rate movements will be reversed 
in the future, judgmental forecasts of novices exhibit a structure which is consistent 
with the phenomena of mean reversion often observed in financial time series (see 
Cutler et al., [1990]). The results coincide with the results of De Bondt, [1993] who 
studied probabilistic forecasts of students in several experimental settings. He found 
evidence that novices expect a continuation of past trends, while experts expect a 
reversal. 
4.3  Discussion of the results 
Section 2 and 3 have revealed that the accuracy professional exchange rate forecasts and 
judgmental forecasts of novices is significantly different from one another. Therefore 
we decided to analyze the expectations of professional forecasters and novices in more 
detail to extract important differences in their expectations. Overall, we have found two 
remarkable differences. First, professional forecasters form predominantly regressive 
expectations whereas novices show a tendency to extrapolate recent trends in the short-
run (one step ahead forecasts) and expect a reversal in the long-run (six step ahead 
forecasts). Second, the tests of unbiasedness show that professional forecasts are over 
all forecast horizons biased predictors of future exchange rates, whereas judgmental 
forecasts of novices appear to be unbiased.  
These results may serve as advice for an explanation for the inferior forecasting 
accuracy of market forecasts compared to judgmental forecasts. Professional exchange 
rate forecasts seem to be biased by fundamental considerations as these forecasts are 
oriented towards the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate. Figure 10 clearly shows 
that professional forecasters expected for the whole period that the €/US-$ rate should 
appreciate towards its fundamental value in the future. Here, the fundamental value is   25
measured by the purchasing power parity using consumer price indices. The 
corresponding PPP level is around 1.20 US-$/€ and coincides largely with other 
estimates for the US-$/€ fundamental equilibrium rate (see Table 19). Overall, the 
phenomena of an expected convergence towards the fundamental exchange rate is more 
distinctive the longer the forecast horizon is. However, Figure 10 also reveals that 
professional forecasters do not expect an immediate adjustment of the actual exchange 
rate to its fundamental level. Professional forecasters rather assume that current 
exchange rates only move gradually towards the PPP level. The sluggishness in the 
expected exchange rate movements, although it seems reasonable at first glance, clearly 
contradicts the predictions of the efficient market hypothesis. According to the efficient 
market hypothesis, deviations of the actual exchange rate from its fundamental justified 
level evoke speculative trading activities of rational market participants that bring the 
actual exchange rate directly towards its fundamental value (see Friedman, [1953]). 
Table 19: Selected estimates for the US-$/€ fundamental equilibrium rate 
  Reference period  Equilibrium exchange rate 
(US-$/€) 
Wren-Lewis and Driver (1998)  2000  1.19 – 1.45 
Borowski and Couharde (2000)  1999 (first half)  1.23 – 1.31 
Clostermann and Schnatz (2000)  Winter 1999/2000  Short-run: 1.20 
Medium-run: 1.13 
Chinn and Alquist (2001)  June 2000  Medium-run: 1.17 – 1.24 
Lorenzen and Thygesen (2000)  1999 Long-run:  1.28 
Goldman Sachs (2000)  May 2000  1.21 
Source: Schneider, [2003], European Central Bank, [2002] 
 
Rationales for expecting a sluggish adjustment to the fundamental rate expectations can 
be found in the reasons for the rejection of the efficient market hypothesis. Contrary to 
the efficient market hypothesis, foreign exchange markets are dominated by 
heterogeneous traders which follow – at least partially – irrational trading practices such 
as technical analysis, bandwagon expectations and herding (see Menkhoff, [1998], 
Cheung and Chinn, [2001]and Gehrig and Menkhoff, [2004]). These trading practices 
may be responsible for long-lasting deviations of the actual exchange rate from its 
fundamental level and may cause that adjustments towards that level occur – if at all –
only gradually. Thus, it is quite reasonable for professional forecasters to expect that the 
adjustment to the fundamental level does not occur in an abrupt manner but sluggishly. 
A further explanation for sluggish expectations with respect to the adjustment to PPP 
levels can be found in the representativeness heuristics (see Kahneman et al., [1999]). 
According to this heuristics, subjects tend to believe that past movements of exchange 
rates are representative for the data generating process of the exchange rate itself and it 
is likely that similar movements will recur in the future. Thus, professional forecasters 
assume that the speed of adjustment towards the fundamental level is limited by the 
usually observable exchange rate movements.   26






































































































































































Note: the fundamental exchange rate is calculated according to the purchasing power parity using 
consumer price indices. As starting point for the calculation of the fundamental exchange rate we use the 
actual exchange rates at the time of the Louvre Accord in February 1987. 
To assess the suggestion of fundamental-biased professional exchange rate forecasts, we 
compare these forecasts with artificial fundamental-oriented forecasts. We decided to 
approximate the fundamental value of the €/US-$ exchange rate by the purchasing 
power parity condition (PPP) as it is an adequate long-run equilibrium exchange rate 
model (see Sarno and Taylor, [2002]). Furthermore, we incorporate an inertia factor that 
accounts for the sluggishness of expectations. We assume that the artificial 
fundamental-oriented forecasts predict an appreciation of the €/US-$ rate if the current 
rate is below its fundamental value and a depreciation if the current rate is above its 
fundamental value: 
  ( )
()
if :  S 1
if :  S 1









 <+  =  >−  
 (9)   27
where  t S  is the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate measured by the purchasing 
power parity and αh denotes an inertia factor. The values for the inertia factor αh vary 
with the forecast horizon and are deduced from the mean absolute exchange rate 
changes over three different forecast horizons; i.e. α1 = 0.02, α3 = 0.05 and α6 = 0.06. 
Figure 11 illustrates the professional exchange rate forecasts and the corresponding 
artificial fundamental-oriented forecasts calculated according to equation (9). Both 
kinds of forecasts show akin characteristics. This visual impression is also assured by 
the correlation between the professional forecasts and the artificial fundamental-
oriented forecasts (see Table 20). In our opinion therefore it is accurate to claim that 
professional exchange rate forecasts are biased towards a fundamental value. This 
finding is also supported by the results of a recent survey conducted by the Zentrum für 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW). According to this survey, the interviewed 
financial analysts state that they base their forecasts to about 60% on fundamental 
considerations (see Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), [2004]). 

































































































Table 20: Correlation between professional and artificial forecasts 












6 months ZEW 
forecasts 
Correlation 
coefficient  0.9918 0.9821  0.975  0.9566 0.9795 
We think that the strict orientation of professional exchange rate forecasts on the 
fundamental level of the €/US-$ rate, however, is an unwise decision. Due to the 
speculative nature of foreign exchange markets macroeconomic factors are judged to be 
more or less unimportant in the short and medium run. Cheung and Wong, [2000] and   28
Cheung and Chinn, [2001] report that traders believe that the poor performance of 
fundamental exchange rate models is due to excessive speculation in foreign exchange 
markets. 
In contrast, speculative markets tend to cause the exchange rates to move in long trends. 
This can be explained with the widespread usage of technical analysis in foreign 
exchange markets. Taylor and Allen, [1992] report that large parts of foreign exchange 
traders rest their expectations formation upon technical analysis at least in the short and 
medium run (see Taylor and Allen, [1992], p. 308). More recently, Cheung et al., 
[2000], Cheung and Wong, [2000] and Cheung and Chinn, [2001] systematically 
analyze the British, Asian and American foreign exchange markets by using 
questionnaires. Their results also suggest that technical analysis is a widely used tool in 
foreign exchange markets. The survey of Gehrig and Menkhoff, [2004] even shows that 
the importance of technical analysis in foreign exchange markets has increased in recent 
times. Furthermore, trend extrapolative expectations are a reasonable choice in foreign 
exchange markets. Many empirical studies reveal that technical analysis, which is 
primarily based on trend extrapolation, is a useful and profitable tool in foreign 
exchange markets. Okunev and White, [2003] analyze the profitability of momentum-
based strategies in various foreign exchange markets. Their results indicate that there is 
a potential for investors to generate excess returns by adapting a simple moving average 
rule. This finding is robust to the time periods under consideration, the base currency of 
reference and the benchmark of comparison. Similar results for the profitability of 
technical analysis in foreign exchange markets are also reported by e.g. Neely, [1997] 
Chang and Osler, [1999], LeBaron, [1999] and Neely, [2002]. 
Thomson et al., [2003] arrive at a very similar conclusion when comparing the 
judgmental forecasting accuracy of experts and novices using a simulated currency 
series. Their results indicate that novices perform better than experts throughout all 
experiments. They explain their results by the reluctance of experts to recognize strong 
trends. According to the authors experts’ behaviour is due to their “academic leaning 
towards random walk theory” that may result “in an explicit search for randomness in 
the face of contradictory evidence” (Thomson et al., [2003], p. 248). A related 
conclusion is also given by Van Hoek, [1992] who states that ”… analysts appear to 
expect some reversal in recent exchange rate movements or a return to some long-run 
‘normal’ value” (Van Hoek, [1992], p. 467). De Bondt, [1993] also provides further 
evidence that novices and experts forecast trended time series differently. Experts tend 
to expect a reversal of trends, while novices forecast a continuation.  
5 Conclusion 
The results of our study have revealed that the forecasting accuracy of professional 
forecasters and novices differ substantial from one another. Professional forecasters 
perform significantly worse than naïve random walk forecasts, but novices forecasts at 
least as good as naïve random walk forecasts. To explain this astonishing result, we 
analyze the nature of professional and experimental expectations in more detail. The 
results can be summarized as follows: with regard to the rationality of both kinds of 
expectations, the unbiasedness tests indicate that professional exchange rate forecasts 
are a biased predictor for future exchange rate changes. This result is quite distinctive as 
it holds true over all forecast horizons and for all considered market forecasts. Contrary, 
the results for the judgmental forecasts suggest that these forecasts are unbiased. With   29
respect to the adaptive expectation formation mechanism, our results report that both 
kinds of expectations correspond to the concept of adaptive expectations. However, 
regarding the extrapolative expectation formation mechanism, we found interesting 
differences between professional forecasts and judgmental forecasts. Whereas 
professional forecasters expect predominately a revision of the most recent movements, 
novices believe that in the short-run past changes will repeat themselves in the future 
and in the long-run current movements will be reversed.   30
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